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Introduction
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has an important
and well-defined mission with broad public support. Too often,
however, the Agency has sought to strengthen its position by aligning
itself with politically powerful rent-seeking interests. There are
numerous examples—most recently, the use of the renewable fuels
standards to subsidize ethanol refiners and related agricultural
interests. My wish for the Agency on its fiftieth birthday is that it stays
focused on its own mission and remembers that old adage: “Dilution is
not the solution to pollution.”

I. Agencies Come and Agencies Go
My first full-time job was as an operations research analyst at the
EPA in 1977, under President Jimmy Carter and Administrator Doug
Costle. I returned to serve as the EPA’s Associate Administrator for
Policy, Economics, and Innovation from 2005 to 2009, under President
George W. Bush and Administrator Steve Johnson.
In between those stints, I held several other jobs that let me see the
EPA from different perspectives: from 1979 to 1987 I did economic
†

Brian Mannix is a research professor at The George Washington
University Regulatory Studies Center. He was an operations research
analyst at the EPA in 1977–1978. From 1996–1998 he served as the
Commonwealth of Virginia’s Deputy Secretary of Natural Resources. And
from 2005–2009 he served as the EPA’s Associate Administrator for
Policy, Economics, and Innovation.
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oversight of EPA regulations first at the Council on Wage & Price
Stability and then at the newly created Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
Later, I held a position in state government, supervising the state’s
Department of Environmental Quality and its interactions with the
EPA. For a while I worked at a manufacturing think tank, and learned
the challenges of regulatory compliance from its members.
Along the way I often found reasons to question the Agency’s
decisions, but to this day, the EPA remains my favorite federal agency.
In part that is because I have many friends and colleagues there, but it
is also because, in contrast to many other federal agencies, the EPA has
a persuasive reason to exist.
That may sound odd, but when I first studied public policy in the
1970s, it was common to ask whether a government program was really
necessary, and sometimes the answer was “no.” President Carter
promoted a concept called “zero-based budgeting,” which encouraged a
fundamental review of each program every year.1 (Sadly, it did not last.)
In 1974, under Chairman Ted Kennedy, the Senate Judiciary
Committee held hearings questioning the need for airline regulation by
the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB).2 The hearings were organized by
Special Counsel (now Justice) Stephen Breyer, from whom I took an
administrative law course when he returned to the academy.3 Economist
Alfred Kahn was the star witness at those hearings; he went on to chair
the CAB and to help phase it out of existence.4 This year we celebrate
the thirty-fifth anniversary of the CAB’s abolition.
This year we also celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the trucking
and rail deregulation bills signed by President Carter, and the twentyfifth anniversary of the complete demise of the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC). In fact, the ICC’s old hearing room still exists; it is
now a conference room called Room 1123 EPA East. After a difficult
day in the office, I would sometimes go to that room just to rejoice in
the fact that the ICC was no longer there. We rightly celebrate the
dismantling of those agencies in the era of economic deregulation,5
1.

Charlie B. Tyer, Zero-Base Budgeting: A Critical Analysis, 1 S. Rev.
Pub. Admin. 88, 88–90 (1977).

2.

Edward M. Kennedy, Airline Regulation by the Civil Aeronautics Board,
41 J. Air L. & Com. 607, 607 (1975).

3.

See Stephen Breyer’s Path to the Supreme Court, Nat’l Const. Ctr.:
Const. Daily (Aug. 3, 2017), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/stephenbreyers-path-to-the-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/FB3V-MSU2].

4.

See Robert D. Hershey, Jr., Alfred E. Kahn Dies at 93; Prime Mover of
Airline Deregulation, N.Y. Times (Dec. 28, 2010), https://nytimes.com/
2010/12/29/business/29kahn.html [https://perma.cc/6QHK-ADKW].

5.

See William A. Niskanen, Economic Deregulation in the United States:
Lessons for America, Lessons for China, 8 Cato J. 657, 657 (1989)
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which was a thoroughly bipartisan effort and was a spectacular success
in terms of improving consumer welfare.
At roughly the same time, new agencies were being created to
address environmental, health, and safety concerns. And new
procedures were put in place to guide these social regulatory agencies.
President Clinton’s Executive Order No. 12,866,6 Regulatory Planning
and Review, built on earlier efforts by Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter,
and Reagan, and remains in effect today.7 It specifies that, before
regulating, agencies should state what problem they are trying to solve,
explain why markets are not adequate to solve it, examine the available
alternatives, and use cost–benefit analysis to evaluate the alternatives’
relative merits.8
Applied rigorously, the well-established principles in Clinton’s
executive order might give some agencies considerable trouble. The
Occupational Safety and Health Administration might struggle to
explain why labor markets and traditional common law remedies would
not adequately ensure workplace safety, for example. The Consumer
Product Safety Commission would need to explain how its regulations
improve the function of markets for consumer goods. Where exactly is
the market failure?
But the EPA would have no such trouble explaining why it is
needed. Environmental externalities are a very real problem, and
markets do not exist to handle them adequately. The need for the EPA
is not really in question.
This is not to say we could not find radical ways to improve the
way the EPA approaches its job. There are plenty of opportunities to
strengthen property rights and private remedies for environmental
damage, and to design more market-like regulatory solutions. From the
beginning, the EPA has done some thoughtful work on this topic, but
in its regulatory actions, the impulse to command and control more
often seems to prevail.
We could also do a better job of parsing the federal and state roles
in environmental protection. Contrary to much of the press coverage, I
think the recent rule narrowing the definition of “waters of the United
States” is a step in the right direction.9 States have been protecting
water quality for far longer than fifty years, and in many ways they are
(noting that during the 1980s, the federal government generally reduced
regulation).
6.

58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993).

7.

See Robert J. Duffy, Regulatory Oversight in the Clinton Administration,
27 Presidential Stud. Q. 71, 73, 75 (1997).

8.

See id. at 74–75.

9.

See The Navigable Waters Protection Rule: Definition of “Waters of the
United States”, 85 Fed. Reg. 22,250, 22,251 (Apr. 21, 2020) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 120, 122, 230, 232, 300, 302, & 401).
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better equipped to carry out this task. They have the authority to
regulate land use, for example, which can be one of the most important
tools for protecting water quality.
But in the final analysis, we will still need a federal agency with
responsibility for environmental regulation. The EPA gets its fair share
of criticism, but still enjoys strong bipartisan support and unwavering
public support.10 It therefore should have the confidence to put up a
vigorous resistance when rent-seeking interests seek to bend the
Agency’s authorities towards private aims that often conflict with the
public interest.

II. Of Bootleggers and Baptists
Clemson Professor Bruce Yandle offered a positive theory of social
regulation based on an analogy to the tacit alliance of bootleggers and
Baptists, both of whom, for different reasons, supported alcohol
prohibition11:
Durable social regulation evolves when it is demanded by both of
two distinctly different groups. “Baptists” point to the moral high
ground and give vital and vocal endorsement of laudable public
benefits . . . . “Bootleggers” are much less visible but no less vital.
Bootleggers, who expect to profit from the very regulatory
restrictions desired by Baptists, grease the political machinery
with some of their expected proceeds. They are simply in it for
the money.12

Viewed through this lens, my argument above could be restated as
follows: In contrast to the economic regulatory agencies, the EPA has
a strong “Baptist” case for its existence. Agencies like the CAB and the
ICC were overrun with bootleggers, typically explained by some variant
of “agency capture” theories;13 but their Baptist stories were lacking.
Their stated mission was to protect consumers from the high prices that
would otherwise prevail because of natural monopolies.14 As the
Kennedy–Breyer hearings vividly demonstrated, in practice those
agencies were harming consumers by protecting monopolies—exactly

10.

See How the EPA Became a Victim of Its Own Success, NPR (Feb. 17,
2017), https://npr.org/2017/02/17/515748401/how-the-epa-became-a-victimof-its-own-success [https://perma.cc/F4ER-3S7R].

11.

Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists in Retrospect, 22 Regulation 5,
5 (1999).

12.

Id.

13.

See id. at 7.

14.

William A. Jordan, Producer Protection: Prior Market Structure and the
Effects of Government Regulation, 15 J.L. & Econ. 151, 151–52 (1972).
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the opposite of their stated missions. Thus exposed, the bootleggers
were run out of town during the era of economic deregulation.15
With its strong Baptist mission, the EPA is in no danger of being
run out of town, but it does need to be on guard against bootleggers
who seek to exploit the Agency. In this, it has not always been
successful.
A. “Clean Coal, Dirty Air”

The first example was well documented by Bruce Ackerman and
William Hassler in Clean Coal, Dirty Air.16 In the 1970s, federal
regulation of air quality threatened to put eastern high-sulfur coal at
an economic disadvantage compared to western low-sulfur coal.17 To
prevent this outcome, eastern coal interests fought to shape both the
Clean Air Act and the EPA’s interpretation of it.18 Rather than a
performance standard for sulfur emissions, the EPA required scrubbers.
These worked, but they imposed on the public both higher costs for
electricity and lower air quality than might otherwise have been
achieved.19
It was also during this first decade that the EPA began to
“grandfather in” older electric power plants, effectively creating a
privileged special interest that would present the Agency with many
challenges over the years.20 Agency analysts knew at the time that
alternatives were available: emissions trading systems, like those later
adopted in the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act, would make it
possible to adopt aggressive pollution-reduction goals without having
to carve out exceptions.21 But the model that prevailed at the EPA was
a bootlegger-and-Baptist model: command-and-control regulation with
selectively granted indulgences.

15.

Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of
Regulated Industries Law, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1323, 1366–68 (1998).

16.

See generally Bruce A. Ackerman & William T. Hassler, Clean
Coal/Dirty Air (1981).

17.

See id. at 17–19.

18.

See id. at 18.

19.

See id. at 12–34.

20.

Richard Revesz et al., Grandfathering Coal: Power Plant Regulation
Under the Clean Air Act, 46 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis 10,541,
10,541 (2016).

21.

Richard E. Ayres, The 1990 Clean Air Amendments: Performance and
Prospects, 13 Nat. Resources & Env’t 379, 381 (1998).
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B. The “Land Ban” of Hazardous Waste

In 1984, Congress enacted the Hazardous and Solid Waste
Amendments to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.22 Both
the legislation and the EPA’s subsequent implementing regulations
were strategically shaped by the Hazardous Waste Treatment Council
(HWTC), a trade association that, to an economist, looked very much
like a cartel.23 At the time, only a limited number of facilities were
legally permitted to treat hazardous waste, and the HWTC worked
hard to ensure that every other method of waste disposal—whether
land disposal or incineration at sea—was outlawed.24 They insisted on
technology-based rather than risk-based standards for treatment in
order to protect their captive market from any innovator who might
come up with a better means of disposal.25 The Council also insisted
that used oil be classified as a hazardous waste, in order to prevent its
beneficial recycling. The result of their efforts was severely limited
capacity and very high prices for hazardous waste disposal—profitable
for the members of the HWTC but harmful to consumers, and, very
likely, the environment, due to all the illegal dumping of hazardous
waste that the high prices encouraged.26
C. Protecting the Ozone Layer, and a Manufacturer

Pursuant to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer, a treaty signed in 1987,27 the EPA has phased out various
halogenated hydrocarbons, especially refrigerants.28 This phase-out
proceeded in stages over many years as new refrigerants that were less

22.

Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, 42 U.S.C. § 6901
(2012).

23.

See Susan E. Dudley, Bootleggers & Baptists: The Experience of Another
Regulatory Economist 5–6 (Nov. 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the George Washington University Regulatory Studies Center), available
at https://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/bootleggers-baptistsexperience-another-regulatory-economist [https://perma.cc/UV3M-25GJ].

24.

See id. at 6.

25.

Id.; William Boyes, Managerial Economics: Markets and the
Firm 177 (2d ed. 2011).

26.

Dudley, supra note 23, at 6.

27.

Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16,
1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 26,369. The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments gave
the EPA the authority to issue regulations implementing this treaty. See
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399
(1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4213 (2012)).

28.

Protection on Stratospheric Ozone: Update to the Refrigerant
Management Requirements Under the Clean Air Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 82,272,
82,275 (Nov. 18, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 82).
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harmful to the ozone layer were brought to market.29 The phase-out
was coordinated globally, but mostly the EPA seems to have
coordinated with the leading manufacturer of covered halogenated
hydrocarbons, DuPont (now Chemours).30 Indeed, one striking feature
of the phase-out is that older refrigerants seem to have been banned
just when their patent protection was due to expire, and when a newly
patented replacement chemical became available.31 The net result has
been to restrict competition in the market for refrigerants, globally as
well as domestically, resulting in sustained high prices. To be sure, the
Montreal Protocol has been successful in halting and reversing damage
to the ozone layer;32 but the manner in which it was done has been
profitable for the manufacturer and very expensive for consumers.
D. Picking the Perfect Pesticide

The EPA’s registration (and re-registration) of pesticides resembles
in many ways the Food and Drug Administration’s approval of new
drugs, and in both cases the agencies feel pressure to use their health
and safety authorities to erect barriers to competition. A manufacturer
may argue, for example, that its proprietary formulation is superior to
all competitors in a particular application, and that the agency should
therefore ban the others. Even when the argument has merit, however,
that approach tends to create government-protected monopolies, and
can sacrifice the substantial advantages of competition and innovation.
E. CAFE Standards

The Department of Transportation has issued Corporate Average
Fuel Economy standards since the 1970s but, after Massachusetts v.
EPA was decided in 2007, the EPA has adopted a parallel program
under the Clean Air Act to control greenhouse gases.33 In doing so, the
EPA has adopted many of the bootlegger pathologies that have long
29.

See Office of Air & Radiation, EPA, EPA-430-R-07-001,
Achievements in Stratospheric Ozone Protection 18–19 (2007).

30.

See Chuck Booten et al., Clean Energy Manufacturing Analysis
Center, Refrigerants: Market Trends and Supply Chain
Assessment 1, 24, 33, 39, 49 (2020); Sharon Lerner, How a Dupont
Spinoff Lobbied the EPA to Stave Off the Use of Environmentally Friendly
Coolants, Intercept (Aug. 25, 2018), https://theintercept.com/2018/08/
25/chemours-epa-coolant-refrigerant-dupont/ [https://perma.cc/XQG3P2KE].

31.

See Booten et al., supra note 30, at 19.

32.

See Stephen Leahy, Without the Ozone Treaty You’d Get Sunburned
in 5 Minutes, Nat’l Geographic (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.national
geographic.com/news/2017/09/montreal-protocol-ozone-treaty-30-climatechange-hcfs-hfcs.html [https://perma.cc/X2MC-W4BJ].

33.

Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,499–
500 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. I).
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plagued the CAFE program. Just as appliance manufacturers use the
Department of Energy’s (DOE) appliance efficiency standards to
exclude low-priced foreign competitors from the U.S. market, domestic
auto manufacturers try to shape the CAFE standards in ways that
provide a competitive advantage. The standards are tiered so that light
trucks—broadly defined, and popular with American consumers—get a
looser standard. And the EPA adopted the “footprint method” of
calculating mileage—giving extra credit to cars with a long and wide
wheelbase.34 There is no environmental or other public benefit
associated with a large footprint; it is simply a way of creating a
regulatory obstacle to imported vehicles that typically have smaller
footprints. Much of the unfortunate squabbling over the CAFE
standards has nothing to do with climate or any public benefit; instead
it reflects the efforts of bootleggers to tilt to their own advantage the
various cross-subsidies embedded in the details of the CAFE rules.
F. Getting the Lead Out of Gasoline

Beginning in 1973, the EPA set limits on the use of tetraethyl lead,
an octane booster, in gasoline.35 There were two reasons for limiting
lead use, and therefore two different requirements. The first reason was
that the EPA was mandating catalytic converters on new cars; lead
would poison those catalysts, so the EPA also mandated that gas
stations carry unleaded gasoline.36 The second rationale was that lead
emissions from automobiles were a direct health threat, so the EPA
limited the quantity of lead additives used in leaded gasoline, and
lowered those limits over time.37
This “lead phase-down” was in many ways an ideal candidate for a
system of emissions trading. There was no need to measure the level of
emissions: refiners knew exactly how much lead they were adding to
the gasoline, and every gram of lead that went into the gas tank would
be emitted by the tailpipe. But the EPA instead chose the commandand-control-with-exceptions approach. The Agency set a binding limit,

34.

Average Fuel Economy Standards for Light Trucks; Model Years 2008–
2011, 70 Fed. Reg. 51,414, 51,416, 51,418 (proposed Aug. 30, 2005) (to be
codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 523, 533, & 537).

35.

See Fact Sheet—A Brief History of Octane in Gasoline: From Lead to
Ethanol, Envtl. & Energy Study Inst. (Mar. 30, 2016), https://www
.eesi.org/papers/view/fact-sheet-a-brief-history-of-octane [https://perma.cc/
Y2NY-M57N].

36.

V.M. Thomas, The Elimination of Lead in Gasoline 20 Ann. Rev.
Energy & Env’t 301, 312 (1995).

37.

Jack Lewis, Lead Poisoning: A Historical Perspective, EPA J., May 1985,
at 15, available at https://archive.epa.gov/epa/aboutepa/lead-poisoninghistorical-perspective.html [https://perma.cc/CU24-F6XF].
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measured in grams of lead per gallon of gasoline, for larger refiners.38
But it made exceptions for several tiers of small refiners.39 The smallest
could use more than five times as much lead as large refiners.40
At the time, small refiners were among the most powerful lobbyists
in Washington. Oil and oil products were subject to price and allocation
regulations administered by the DOE, which adopted a “small refiner
bias” that funneled billions of dollars’ worth of oil entitlements to the
small refiners.41
In one of his first acts as President, Ronald Reagan deregulated oil
prices and thus ended DOE’s small refiner bias.42 At the same time, his
Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief requested that the EPA
re-examine the lead phase-down regulations.43 It asked the Agency to
evaluate the most recent health evidence to see what level of lead use
could be justified;44 and it asked the Agency to apply that level
uniformly to all gasoline producers, using emissions trading, rather than
exceptions, to accommodate the varying needs of different refiners.
Initially the EPA’s Air Office resisted both of these requests, but
its Policy Office had long sought to adopt emissions trading, and this
was a perfect opportunity to try it. In 1982, the Agency promulgated a
new rule that kept the total amount of lead at the same level as the old
lead phase-down rules, but with a uniform limit on all refiners, and
38.

Richard G. Newell & Kristian Rogers, Res. for the Future, The
U.S. Experience with the Phasedown of Lead in Gasoline 3 (2003)
(“Large refiners . . . were to produce a quarterly average of no more than
0.8 grams per gallon (gpg) for the first year and 0.5 gpg the next two
years.”).

39.

Id. (“small refiners . . . faced a scale of five different standards”).

40.

See id. (“the smallest refiners being permitted 2.65 gpg, and the largest
of the small refiners being permitted 0.8 gpg”).

41.

Notices of January 1981 and Entitlements Adjustments, 49 Fed. Reg.
27,410, 27,411 (July 3, 1984).

42.

Robert D. Hershey, Jr., President Abolishes Last Price Controls on U.S.Produced Oil, N.Y. Times (Jan. 29, 1981), https://www.nytimes.com/
1981/01/29/us/president-abolishes-last-price-controls-on-us-produced-oil.html
[https://perma.cc/7XFX-JSCZ].

43.

Herbert L. Needleman, The Removal of Lead from Gasoline: Historical
and Personal Reflections, in 2 Public Health: The Development of
a Discipline 181, 200–01 (Dona Schneider & David E. Lilienfeld eds.,
2011).

44.

See William Greider, When Big Business Needs a Favor, George Bush
Gets the Call, Rolling Stone (Apr. 12, 1984, 12:00 PM), https://www
.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/when-big-business-needs-a-favorgeorge-bush-gets-the-call-240823/ [https://perma.cc/3P9G-CPK4]. Some
refiners, most notably Arco, had argued that no limits were needed. Arco
changed its position when it realized that a subsidiary, Arco Chemical,
was the leading producer of feedstocks for octane boosters that would
substitute for lead.
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trading to give flexibility.45 The small refiners sued, arguing that
emissions trading would never work.46 By the time they got to court,
however, it was already working smoothly. Refiners could buy as many
lead rights as they needed, at a price of about one cent per gram.47
The result of this reform was striking. In the next three years, more
than half of all refiners in the United States closed. The small refiners
had served no real economic purpose, they existed only to collect the
subsidies provided by the DOE and the EPA.
There is another chapter to this story. On his own initiative, Joel
Schwartz (then in the EPA’s Policy Office; now at Harvard’s School of
Public Health) completed the study of the health effects of lead in
gasoline that the OMB had requested. Following a briefing on the
study, the OMB asked the EPA to propose the complete removal of
lead from gasoline, which it did in 1984.48 At this point there was almost
no resistance to the proposal because lead was no longer being used to
subsidize small refiners. The lesson is that regulation to protect the
environment is much easier to accomplish when it is not entangled with
the private interests of bootleggers.
The rest of the world followed the U.S. initiative; the Persian Gulf
oil producers deserve special credit for facilitating the removal of leaded
gasoline from the continents of Africa and Asia.49 The United Nations
Environment Program has estimated the global health benefits of lead
removal at nearly $2.4 trillion per year.50
G. The Ethanol Bootleggers

The EPA’s Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS) mandates certain
ratios of renewable fuels to fossil fuels used in motor vehicles.51 This
45.

EPA Sets New Limits on Lead in Gasoline, EPA, https://archive.epa.gov/
epa/aboutepa/epa-sets-new-limits-lead-gasoline.html [https://perma.cc/
XWU3-KSDX] (last updated Sept. 16, 2016).

46.

Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 511,
534 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

47.

Id. at 536 & n.85.

48.

Kenneth Bridbord & David Hanson, A Personal Perspective on the Initial
Federal Health-Based Regulation to Remove Lead from Gasoline, 117
Envtl. Health Persp. 1195, 1199–2000 (2009).

49.

See Marc Lacey, Belatedly, Africa Is Converting to Lead-Free Gasoline,
N.Y. Times (Oct. 31, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/31/world/
africa/belatedly-africa-is-converting-to-leadfree-gasoline.html [https://
perma.cc/VT7W-CQDZ].

50.

Phase-Out of Leaded Petrol Brings Huge Health and Cost Benefits—UNBacked Study, U.N.: News (Oct. 27, 2011), https://news.un.org/en/
story/2011/10/393292-phase-out-leaded-petrol-brings-huge-health-and-costbenefits-un-backed-study [https://perma.cc/H8AV-48QZ].

51.

Overview for Renewable Fuel Standard, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/
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type of ratio constraint can be thought of as having two shadow prices:
it creates a cross-subsidy by taxing the denominator and subsidizing
the numerator. Thus the RFS effectively taxes gasoline and diesel fuel,
and subsidizes ethanol and biodiesel. This mechanism is not itself
objectionable; the lead-trading program described above also functioned
through a ratio constraint; and, like the lead program, the RFS program
allows for trading. The problem is that the case for renewable fuels,
especially ethanol, is largely a bootlegger case. The promotion of
ethanol fuel has been expensive, harmful to air and water quality, and
of no discernable benefit to the climate. In recent years, it has been the
Agriculture Department, more than the EPA, that has been advocating
for aggressive RFS standards.
The cost of the RFS is passed through to consumers in the price of
fuels, but that has not stopped some oil refiners from requesting relief.52
The EPA began granting exemptions from the RFS to refiners who
argued that they could not afford to buy allowances (known as RINs)
in the market.53 Given the history of the lead phase-down program
above, it is dismaying to see how the RFS program has evolved. The
EPA soon learned that the refiners who were granted exemptions then
turned around and shorted the RIN market, based on the insider
information that their own exemption was going to drive future RIN
prices lower.
The Agency has started to make the granting of RFS exemptions
public in order to avoid this insider trading in the RIN market. Even
so, the effect of the exemptions is to create yet another class of
bootleggers. Consumers are still paying needlessly high prices for fuel,
while ethanol refiners and select oil refiners are squabbling over how
the spoils should be divided. Any environmental benefit in all this is
difficult to find.

Conclusion: Is the EPA a Victim or a Perpetrator?
The examples above are necessarily very abbreviated accounts of
what are much more complicated stories.54 I chose them just to
illustrate the frequency with which bootleggers attempt to commandeer
renewable-fuel-standard-program/overview-renewable-fuel-standard [https://
perma.cc/QZP9-P6BF] (last updated June 7, 2017).
52.

See Scott Irwin, Clearing the Logjam on the RFS and SREs: A Simple
Proposal, farmdoc daily, Sept. 19, 2019, at 4, available at
https://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2019/09/clearing-the-logjam-on-the-rfsand-sres-a-simple-proposal.html [https://perma.cc/2RN2-TTEL].

53.

Id. at 1–2, 4.

54.

For more detail on some examples, see Jonathan H. Adler, Rent Seeking
Behind the Green Curtain, 4 Regulation 26 (1996), https://www.cato.org/
sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/1996/10/v19n4-4.pdf [https://
perma.cc/CJM4-UKKZ].
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the EPA’s regulatory authorities, and bend the rules towards private
gains.
But is it fair to blame the EPA for this phenomenon? Not entirely.
Often the Agency is acting in response to pressure from Congress or the
White House, or even in response to mandates that result from
litigation. In many cases, the bootlegger stories above played out more
in the legislative arena than in the process of administrative rulemaking. And external political forces always will—indeed, they always
must—play a role in shaping policy.
Even so, the EPA must take some responsibility for letting its
attention wander from its core mission. The program offices within the
EPA are themselves interested parties, and actively engage in the
rough-and-tumble of the politics that preoccupy the denizens of D.C.
In my observation, the EPA’s offices will sometimes actively collaborate
with bootleggers in an attempt to build political support for the
expansion of one program or another. In the long run, I think the EPA
will be more successful by resisting entanglement with bootleggers, and
by keeping its environmental mission, and the public interest,
paramount.
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